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THE

issue of the closed shop is one of the most hotly contested
and perplexing in the whole field of industrial relations. The advocates of the closed shop believe that it is necessary in order to
protect union members from being gradually weeded out by employers
through lay-offs and discharges and to prevent their replacement by nonunionists. Further, it is necessary in order that all workers contribute to
the support of the organization which acts for them in grievance matters
and which helps to reduce hours and obtain better working conditions for
them. If this is not done, the supporters of the closed shop allege that the
lazy and indifferent will reap without sowing and will either not join or will
drop out of the unions and hence will allow the burden of expense and
effort to be borne by the self-sacrificing and idealistic minority.
The opponents of the closed shop, on the other hand, object to it on the
ground that it can be used to help saddle inefficiencies upon industry
which will in the long run be adverse to labor, to employers, and to the
consuming public, and that it is improper to force anyone against his will
to join a union as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment.
The arguments which are used in support of these positions are cogent
and weighty. Neither side, however, seems able to make many converts
among those who hold to an opposing point of view and on this level the
discussion often seems to have come to an intellectual stalemate.
Before turning to a possible reconciliation of these opposite sets of
values and interests, it is perhaps appropriate to discuss briefly the
changes which have been introduced by the National Labor Relations Act
and also to review various devices which have been developed to soften
the impact of the closed shop.
There would seem to be little doubt that the Wagner Act has somewhat weakened the case for the dosed shop. Thus the act provides that it
is an unfair practice for an employer:
(i) "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of
their right to unionize and bargain collectively, or
(2) to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
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by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employer."
If it can be proved that a union man has been discriminated against
because of these reasons, the National Labor Relations Board can order
him reinstated and paid damages equal to the wages he has lost. The employers, therefore, cannot legally use their power of discharge to break up
a union. Has not the main reason for the closed shop therefore been removed?
While there is some force to this contention, it would seem to be only
partially true. For in the first place, the law can only sift out and deal
with the most obvious cases of discriminatory discharge. There is a fine
art to getting rid of men whom one dislikes and most employers and managers are rapidly becoming expert practitioners of this art.
A second point is connected with lay-offs caused by seasonal or cyclical
declines in business. At such times it is easy for the employers, unless restrained by other rules, to pay off old scores and guard against future
dangers by concentrating the lay-offs from among the active union men.
This is especially hard to detect and to prevent when a large number are
being laid off. This tendency can indeed be checked by the introduction of
seniority systems and this is perhaps the chief driving force behind the
establishment of such systems. But so far as my observation goes, the
introduction of seniority systems generally, although by no means universally, follows the establishment of the closed shop and is a further
manifestation of increasing union control. It is doubtful if seniority would
be widely adopted were unions to be weak. And it is because the proponents of the closed shop want to make unions strong that they insist
upon it.
If the Wagner Act has somewhat weakened the arguments of the advocates of the closed shop, certain modifications in that institution should
have softened some of the objections of its opponents. Thus it was over
thirty-five years ago at the instance of the late Louis D. Brandeis that the
famous protocol for the women's clothing industry provided that in hiring,
union men should be preferred, but that' "employers shall have freedom
of selection as between one union man and another and shall not be confined to any list, nor bound to follow any prescribed order whatever." This
gave the employer greater freedom and did not oblige him to hire every
one whom the union sent. This provision has been widely copied in a number of industries. It is often accompanied by a further provision that if
after a stated period of time, the union is unable to provide a satisfactory
I Mason, Brandeis-A Free Man's Life Soi (1946).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHCAGO LAW REVIEW

workman for an opening, the employer is then free to hire a non-union
man.
In recent years a still further modification has been introduced in the
mass production industries in the form of the so-called "union shop."
Here the employer is permitted to hire anyone he wishes, whether nonunion or union. It is merely stipulated that after a given period, the nonunion employees are to join the union if they are to retain their jobs.
Finally there is the so-called "maintenance-of-membership" provision
which the National War Labor Board introduced as a compromise during
the war. This permits those who were not members of the union on a given
date to continue in their status and still hold their jobs. But it also prevents those who were union members on a given date after a transitional
"escape period" from resigning from the union or allowing their membership to lapse. While this decision respected the conscientious objections of
those who were not originally union members, it prevented those who were
already members from changing their minds and bound them by their
past decisions. Maintenance of membership, therefore, permitted those
who already had strong objections to unionism to stay outside of these
organizations and yet not be deprived of their jobs. But it provided that
the unions be protected against any future backsliding on the part of their
members.
Taken as a whole, therefore, while these modifications of the closed
shop soften its impact, they do not change its fundamental character. It
is still a device whereby men, as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment, are compelled to join or refrain from leaving a union.
It is important to realize that the determination as to whether or not
the dosed shop shall be put into effect is now primarily made in individual
cases according to the relative bargaining strength of the union and the
employer. It is something which the union can impose, along with other
terms, under threat of a strike, even though the workers in a particular
plant or company are not deeply in its favor. And yet if the demand is
once made by union leaders, the rank and file may feel obligated to walk
out if it is not granted because the dosed shop issue is involved with other
terms about which the workers are deeply concerned, or because of loyalty
to the general cause of unionism which they may feel is involved, once the
issues narrow down to a test of strength. Moreover, once the strike is
called, the union does not depend solely upon the loyalty of the immediate
workers involved, but it can also call upon the loyalties and resources of
workers employed by other companies to impose its will upon the employer in question: It can do this by having these other workers and
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members contribute to the financial support of those out on strike, by
manning the picket lines with members largely recruited from outside,
and by using these outside unionists to enforce secondary boycotts against
the products turned out by the primary company.
It may often be possible, therefore, for union leaders by using, or tacitly
threatening to use, these methods to induce employers to yield on the
closed shop issue despite the fact that it may not be warmly desired by
the men immediately concerned.
On the other hand, if the union is comparatively weak in finances and
in outside connections, it may frequently be possible for the employer to
prevent the closed shop from coming into being even though the majority
of the workers feel an intense need for the protection which it would give.
In other words with the issue determined under the power struggle of collective bargaining, the closed shop is frequently obtained where the workers need and desire it the least and is often denied where the workers
need and desire it the most.
A POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION

I should now like to make a suggestion which may possibly improve the
situation. This is to take the issue of the dosed shop out of the area of
collective bargaining and make it (like the determination as to whether the
workers want collective bargaining and if so, through whom) a condition
antecedent to collective bargaining. Stated briefly, it consists in letting
the workers themselves decide in a free and fair election whether or not
they want the closed shop. I hasten to add that this suggestion is in no
sense original with me. So far as I know, it was first advanced by Mr. Arthur S. Meyer, the experienced chairman of the New York State Board of
Mediation, who deserves a great deal of credit for his informed ingenuity
in this as in many other matters.
There is sound precedent for this step in the development which the
Wagner Act effected in the field of representation. Prior to that act, it was
common practice for employers to refuse to bargain collectively with those
who claimed to represent their workers on the ground I) that the employees did not really desire to bargain collectively and 2) that in any
event the workers did not desire the particular union concerned or its
representatives to act for them. Such for example, was the attitude taken
by Judge Gary of the United States Steel Corporation and by other leading steel companies during the big organizing campaign in steel in i9i9.
Now, the tragedy of the situation prior to the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act was that there was no mutually acceptable way of
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determining what the workers really wanted. It was always possible for
employers to discount the fact of workers signing applications for union
membership by either questioning these signatures or by claiming that
they were obtained under duress and did not represent the real desires of
the workers. In some cases this was true but even when it was false there
was no way of proving that this was so.
The result was that commonly the issue as to whether the workers wanted to bargain collectively through given representatives could only be determined by a strike. This not only interrupted production and bred illwill, but it was no sure test as to what the workers wanted. For the results
were determined by the comparative strength of the contestants rather
than by the real desires of the employees. The strike was indeed a no
more effective method of determining these facts than was trial by combat
a way of rendering individual justice in feudal times or war a means of deciding equitably between nations.
Now while there are incompletenesses in the Wagner Act and doubtless
some abuses in its administration, I submit that it was a mighty step
forward when it made the issue of whether or not the workers desired
collective bargaining a matter of ascertainable fact rather than one of
negotiation by the interested parties or a matter of combat. It provided
instead that when the issue was in doubt, the workers themselves should
vote on what they wanted in fair and impartially supervised elections.
And while the National Labor Relations Board has been bitterly attacked
by employers on many grounds I have never known it to be criticized for
the way in which it conducted these elections. Whatever other changes
may be made in the act, I hardly believe that this feature will be abolished,
unless a tidal wave of blind reaction should sweep over our country.
I should like to ask why the same procedure should not be applied to
the issue of the closed shop. Instead of letting it be decided by an economic
combat, why should it not be decided instead by referendum? Then when
the parties sit down to negotiate the terms of a collective agreement they
can confine themselves to questions of wages, hours, and working conditions without having the situation muddied by the issue of the closed
shop. There may be vital defects in this plan, but I confess that up to date
it seems to me to be essentially sound.
There are of course certain procedural details which would be essential
to a satisfactory working out of any such plan. First, I take it that it is
obvious that in a plant or industry which is adopting collective bargaining
for the first time, such a referendum should follow and not precede the
election to choose a bargaining agent. If the workers reject the idea of col-
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lective bargaining outright, then there is obviously no need to submit the
further issue of the closed shop to the workers.
Second, the issue should only be submitted to referendum if the bargaining representatives who have been chosen demand this of the employers. If, for any reasons, they do not raise the issue, it is probably infinitely better to let the sleeping dogs lie. Employers should not, however,
have the power to agree or be forced into agreeing to such an arrangement
without referring the matter to the workers by a referendum.
Third, the precise nature of the type of dosed shop desired should be
carefully and succinctly described by the union in writing and printed on
the ballot. The voters themselves would, however, only vote "yes" or
"no" on the proposition itself. This requirement that the precise proposition be defined would in turn be a force which would tend to prevent the
unions from proposing the more obnoxious forms of the dosed shop and
would tend to lead to the more reasonable forms being proposed.
Fourth, in view of the tremendous importance which the choice of the
closed shop might have upon the affairs of a business, I believe it is only
proper that the employers should have the right to acquaint the workers
with their own preferences and the reasons why they believe as they do.
As a matter of fact, I believe they, as well as national unions, should have
that right in connection with the choice of a bargaining unit. But the case
for this is much stronger in the issue of the dosed shop, where what is at
stake is a limitation of the employers' right to hire and retain. Such a right
to propagandize should, of course, be exercised soberly by all parties,
without undue defamation or excessive expenditures. These are all problems in the political state for which perfect answers have certainly not as
yet been found. If we can approximate the restraints which are now imposed in connection with governmental elections we will be doing well and
we will certainly be effecting a big improvement over the present situation.
Fifth, if the proposal isadopted, it will, I think be admitted that the
workers should be protected against discrimination for any lawful activities during the referendum process.
Sixth, decision by a majority vote would seem the only equitable method. This is the method which we use in political democracy and to require
more than this would be to give to members of a minority a greater importance than those of a majority.
Seventh, it would be unfair to have such a decision made once and for
all. For if the workers vote the dosed shop into being, abuses may develop
in its operation which may cause the employees to change their minds.
The door should not be dosed to such a possible change of opinion. Elec-
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tors should no more be given the power to vote for a perpetual dosed shop
than to vote for a president for life. Conversely, the workers might turn
down a dosed shop at one period, but later on the basis of more experience
become convinced that it would be desirable. In my judgment they should
be given that chance.
Of course these elections should not be allowed to occur so frequently as
to keep a plant or company in a continuous electioneering uproar. The
chief task of industry is not to hold elections for the delight of the participants, but to get on with the job of production. I would suggest, therefore, that the referenda should not be held more frequently than once
every four years and then only at the request of either party. This will
make both sides watch their step and be more on guard to prevent possible
abuses from developing than if having once won an election, they were to
be in power forever more.
Eighth, a pressing issue is what should be the unit for voting. In view
of the fact that convictions may vary widely between plants and companies, it would seem unwise to let this issue be decided on an industrywide basis and that instead the unit should not be broader than the company or at most a cluster of companies under unified control and management. This is without prejudice to the possibility that it may be desirable in matters of wages, hours, and other working conditions to have
industry-wide bargaining agreements.
Ninth, a very important final issue is whether any such referendum is to
apply to concerns which do not now have the closed shop or whether the
issue can be opened up afresh in firms where this is already established.
To the degree that the unions come to favor any such plan at all, they will
obviously tend to want only the former of these alternatives. For this
would permit them to hold what they have already obtained through collective bargaining and by strikes and to expand their area of control
through elections. And yet this would seem to be unfair in those cases
where the workers in given enterprises have tired of the closed shop and
would like to make a change. If the principle suggested is sufficiently fair
so that workers not yet under it may adopt it for new plants, it would
seem only just that workers in plants where it has been adopted should be
given the chance to make a change, if they so desire. If this is not done,
the opponents of the closed shop may properly object that it is a heads I
win, tails you lose proposal.
SOME IMPORTANT CONDITIONS

There are, however, at least two very important conditions of a substantive nature which should be attached to any such proposal.
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The first is that in order for a union recognized as a bargaining agent to
ask for a referendum on the closed shop, it must itself be an "open"
union. To combine the closed shop with an artificially "closed" union
would permit the insiders to wring monopoly gains from the public and
at the same time would force those denied entrance into poorer paid industries where their addition to the social product would be less. It would
in my judgment, be both unwise and improper for the state to protect or
to foster such an anti-social arrangement. While a large degree of autonomy and self-determination should be granted to industrial units to which
the state may properly delegate certain powers of self-government, these
should not be allowed to degenerate into an exploitation of the public. The
interests of a particular occupational group, particularly in those cases
where the demand for the product is relatively inelastic, frequently conflict with those of the public and the public interest is not protected by
giving to occupational groups a completely free rein. This is one of the
chief objections to a syndicalistic or guild regulated society. We need to
keep the occupations open in order to get the best distribution of ability
and to produce at non-monopoly prices the goods which the public
wants. Just as the existing farmers, doctors, and lawyers should not have
the power to determine how many should enter their occupations, nor
businessmen the power to bar competitors, so workers should not have the
power to lock the gate on qualified men who wish to enter.
As is well known, there are some unions which unreasonably restrict
entrance into their ranks by one or more of the following methods: a) by
imposing an outright prohibition upon entrance or narrowly restricting it;
b) by requiring the payment of unreasonably high initiation fees; c) by
requiring a period of apprenticeship appreciably longer than that which is
required to learn the trade or perform the tasks required; d) by limiting
the number of apprentices so rigidly that not enough workers are provided
to meet the demands of the public for products at competitive prices.
The first of these unreasonable requirements can be prevented by an
outright prohibition. The others are far more difficult to define and to
regulate. Certainly initiation fees of $250, $5oo, and even more than this,
are unreasonable and should not be allowed. While it is hard to pick out a
definite figure as the dividing line between what is "reasonable" and "unreasonable," in the matter of initiation fees, I am inclined to believe that
rough justice would be done by fixing the maximum initiation fee to be
charged by a union at approximately $25. So far as I know there are few
unions in the mass production industries which now charge more than
this and the imposition of such a maximum would prevent those now in
the union from making it more difficult for latecomers to enter.
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A further protection which in my judgment should be included is to
provide that no one should be denied entrance into a union because of
race, color, religion, or sex. As is well known some international unions
bar Negroes explicitly from membership and in other cases this is done by
the local unions. In many other cases this is done not by formal rule, but
by accepted, if informal, practice and by a "gentlemen's agreement." In
some unions also it is probable that persons of other races and religions
are at times denied entrance. There is also a fairly frequent discrimination
against women as such.
It is, in my judgment, impossible to justify such discrimination in a
democracy which does not believe in dividing its members into citizens
of different grades. Under the closed shop if unions in considerable numbers bar Negroes and women from membership, they distinctly limit the
employment opportunities of these groups and put them at a grave economic disadvantage. If unions are allowed to expand their membership
by including the unwilling, they should not be permitted to restrict their
membership by excluding workers because of race, religion, or sex. As a
matter of fact this is forbidden by the state labor relations act of Pennsylvania and by the state fair employment practice acts of New York and
New Jersey.
A second basic condition should be to provide some impartial review of
cases of expulsion from unions operating under these closed shop provisions. Some unions, like the International Typographical Union, carefully
safeguard the rights of their members in this matter. There are other
unions, however, where, I have become convinced from such study of individual cases as I have been able to make, grave abuses have occurred.
These instances of abuse seldom find their way into the literature of trade
unionism, but they are no less real. Men have been victimized because
they have honestly opposed the policies of officers in charge of the unions
and, once expelled, have found it difficult to obtain employment. The
granting by the state to the unions of the right to require union membership of the unwilling if it be approved by a majority vote would be a further grant of power by the state which would make of unions even more a
quasi-public body than they are now. It is a truism both of ethics and of
law, however, that no power or institution should have rights without corresponding duties or privileges without commensurate responsibilities.
Men who join a union under these circumstances should be protected
against capricious or unjust expulsion by the union just as much as against
discharge by their employers for union or collective bargaining activities.
Such abuses should be directly forbidden by law and some of the neces-
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sary safeguards should be spelled out in the act itself. These might include the provision that a) the charges against any member should be
stated in writing; b) the accused person should have the right to appear
in his own defense, engage counsel, and summon and cross-examine witnesses; c) if found guilty, the accused should have the right of appeal to
higher union bodies including the international officials; and d) he should
also have the right to appeal to local representatives of the National Labor
Relations Board or suca body as administers the act. The costs of such appeal should, of course, be kept very low and every effort made to settle
appeals quickly.
The question may well be raised if certain other compensatory protections should not also be introduced into any such law. Among these, possible provisions might be a requirement that the union itself must hold
periodic and secret elections at least once every four years, and that local,
district, and national unions make an annual financial statement to their
members as to the amount and general nature of the receipts and expenditures during the given years.
There is little doubt that unions should take more steps toward reform
in these lines. Whether they should be requhed to effect such changes as
a prerequisite for having the privilege of having the closed shop made
subject to the results of a referendum is, however, a moot point. The mere
fact that the workers will have the right to vote on a closed shop and to
reject it if they do not like the union in question will force the unions to do
some housecleaning in order to gain votes. If this can be done voluntarily,
so much the better since it will free the governmental supervisory body
from an added administrative load. But if sufficient reform is not effected
in this manner within a decent interval of time, then serious thought
should at least be given to whether this should not be required by
law.
It will be asked, of course, if the unions should not also be required to
forego the imposition of restrictive rules and practices or what is popularly
known as "feather-bedding." There is little doubt that there are some
such abuses. It is highly desirable that these be removed. The subject is,
however, so complicated and it is so hard to define what are "reasonable"
and what are "unreasonable" restrictions, that it would not seem wise to
include them in the proposed act. It is important not to overburden the
administrative machinery and not all abuses can be removed at any one
time. Gross and unreasonable restrictions, particularly when they involve
the fixation of prices, can still be prosecuted under the Sherman Act as
was done when Thurman Arnold was in charge of this work. Perhaps it
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would be well to leave the matter in this status for a period until it is seen
whether the situation is being cleaned up.
I am aware that the zealots on both sides of this issue of the closed
shop and of unionism in general will probably regard this proposal as a
subterfuge which avoids a decision on the relative merits of unionism and
the closed shop as such. Those who regard unionism as essentially evil in
its effects upon production and upon the relationships between employer
and worker and who believe that under no circumstances should a man
be forced to join a private association against his will, are likely to object
to letting such a moral issue be decided bya majority vote of the workers.
To these men, unionism is itself something evil which should be stamped
out and even if the workers want to extend it, no compromise should
be made.
The more extreme advocates of unionism and the closed shop may take
a similar position. Believing firmly in the righteousness of their cause,
they are likely to believe that unionism is "good" for all workers, irrespective of whether the workers themselves believe it to be or not. This school
may, therefore, favor the compulsory extension of the closed shop by collective bargaining or legal enactment and scorn a process under which the
workers, exposed to opposing propaganda, might decide against them.
There may also be unionists who will think that the conditions which I
have attached are too onerous. Many, for example, will probably not want
the principle of the referendum applied to those plants which already
have the closed shop since they may be fearful that under such an arrangement unionism will lose more than it will gain. They may also oppose action by the state in keeping the unions" open" and in protecting the members against unjust expulsion. They may, therefore, regard the practical
price of these conditions as too great for any benefits which unions may
reap.
Conversely, there may be many employers who believe that they will
have a better practical chance to overthrow the closed shop through state
and national legislation forbidding it than to take the chance of having it
voted in as well as out by the worker.
Both groups may, therefore, on principle and in practice, reject the
method of popular choice as the advocates and opponents of slavery
finally came to reject the doctrine of "squatter sovereignty" advanced
between 1848 and i86o by Lewis Cass and finally by Stephen A. Douglas.
Cass and Douglas strove to make slavery a local issue under which the inhabitants of a territory could decide for themselves by majority vote
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whether or not they would permit the institution of slavery within their
borders. The southern advocates of slavery and their northern allies
were not content with this. They wanted to extend slavery into the territories even though the inhabitants did not want it and finally they legalized their position through the Dred Scott decision. Indeed many of them
wanted to extend slavery as a national institution into the free states
themselves as was evidenced in the boast of Senator Toombs, of Georgia,
that he intended to call the roll of his slaves from the foot of Bunker Hill
monument. On the other hand, Lincoln and his followers wanted to prevent, by national action, the spreading of slavery into the territories and
the extreme abolitionists, such as John Brown, wanted to free the slaves
in the southern states. Under the terrific pressure of these conflicting
forces, the attempt of Douglas and his followers to localize the problem
by letting the territories decide for themselves was defeated.
And yet it is permissible to ask as George Fort Milton, Avery Craven,
and J. C.-Randall have done, whether the program of Douglas was not
after all, wiser than it has seemed. Because the extremists on both sides
would not let it operate, we got the Civil War which Douglas was trying
to avoid. This war freed the slaves which was a great ethical gain, and it
preserved the Union, but it did so at a terrific cost in life, hardship, and
bitterness between sections which even now, after the passage of nearly
a century, is still acute. And while the Negroes have been freed, they are
still grievously oppressed politically, economically, and socially. It is, at
least, possible that we might have made more enduring progress if we had
moved less hastily and drastically. And yet to do this, the extremists on
both sides would have had to maintain a patience and a moderation which
in practice it is hard for those with sharply differing ideologies to display.
It is well to remember the sad, but trenchant, dictum which Mr. Justice
Holmes expressed in his fascinating correspondence with Sir Frederick
Pollock: "As between two groups, each equally convinced with the righteousness of its own cause, I see no ultimate arbitrament but force." Perhaps this is so, but if itis true, it means that incessant civil and international war is the inevitable consequence of sharp differences of opinion and of
moral judgments. I cannot believe that this is either necessary or desirable in the present instance. The peace, harmony, and high productivity
of this nation are far more important than the issue of the dosed shop. Certainly this is a far less pressing moral issue than was slavery. It would be
a great mistake to let ourselves be torn apart by strikes to establish the
dosed shop or by blanket legislative prohibitions of its existence. There
seems to me to be sound merit, therefore, in Mr. Meyer's proposal to let
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the issue be decided plant by plant and company by company in the timehonored and democratic way of free elections. It is because of our free
elections and our willingness to abide by the results that we do not have
revolutions or the secret police in this country. We have built up a political
process by which moral issues can be submitted to the people and their
judgments recorded and put into effect. We have gone on the basis that
as Mr. justice Holmes once said, the "test of truth is its ability to establish itself in the competition of the market." This competition should be
freed from gross misrepresentation and coercive force but can we not trust
in the essential fairness of men when given the facts and the arguments to
winnow out the truth from error? Men and causes which depend upon
getting the permanent approval of the voters have to purge themselves
of gross abuses in order to survive. Public opinion operates to keep our
political parties comparatively decent. If allowed to express itself, it
would, I think, purge unionism from many of its "abuses and help further
to protect the individual workers from being victimized by their employers.
Most young men tend to be impatient with what the lawyers term procedural matters and to be far more interested instead in substantive issues. Only the latter seem to the young to have vitality. But as time passes
and a man grows older, it dawns upon him that a great part of our progress has been made through transforming substantive issues of conflict
into accepted matters of procedure. For it is in this way the society
peacefully disposes of issues which, if not so handled, would tear it apart.
May there not be a moral guide for action in this fact?

